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Abstract: 
The problem of expert analysis and testimony is a relevant and commonplace issue that proves to 
be typical in day-to-day interaction. This is seen in both areas within academia as well as public 
life. To frame this issue in a contemporary context, I begin my analysis of the novice-expert 
problem by surveying the climate change debate. I provide brief descriptions of both dominant 
positions in the debate while exposing the task of a novice to resolve conflicting expert opinions. 
In public policy, it is usual that the policymaker is considered the novice in such relationship, 
therefore featuring the issue’s importance. The novice-expert problem is explicated here through 
its function within public policy regarding legislative decision-making. Epistemologist Alvin 
Goldman suggests that a novice has the ability to consult five sources of evidence in order to 
base the novice-expert relationship on grounds of justified credence rather than on blind trust. A 
component extracted from this list is the strategy of ‘going by the numbers’, which Goldman 
refutes. Notwithstanding, Goldman’s argument is met with contention for reasons equally 
reasonable, defended by David Coady. It is my objective to bridge the gap between both 
positions through the application of my own epistemological analysis (from the position of a 
novice). I propose conditions whereby ‘going by the numbers’ is substantiated therefore 
clarifying the issue a little more. 
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III. Climate Science & The Climate Change Conversation 
To begin, I’d like to provide a brief introduction to climate science that will begin our 
discussion of the novice-expert problem (where a novice is unable to adjudicate disagreement 
between experts). The novice-expert problem as seen in the climate change quandary is one 
instance where a novice encounters competing arguments made by experts. It is the objective of 
a novice to arbitrate the positions and appropriately choose which is defended with the proper 
support of evidence.​ ​The position in which a novice occupies in the novice-expert relationship is 
one of vulnerability. It is important for a novice to engage in activities that seek different forms 
of supporting evidence (i.e. empirical data, credentials, testimony, track records, etc.) in order to 
justify what information is being considered for intellectual guidance. By offering a summary of 
climate science, I endeavor to provide an explanation from which the climate change debate 
derives its purpose (and where we begin to explore the novice-expert dilemma) .  
 Considering the total radiation we receive from the sun, roughly one-third is reflected 
back into space while the remaining two-thirds are absorbed by the earth’s atmosphere, 
prompting a heating effect (​FAQ 1.3)​. This process of the planet’s temperature fluctuation will 
continue so long as radiative equilibrium (outgoing energy=incoming energy) is not reached 
(Frierson). Because most of the radiation from the sun is in the form of small wavelengths the 
earth’s atmosphere easily absorbs them. Inversely, it is more difficult for radiation in the form of 
long wavelengths to escape the atmosphere because greenhouse gases absorb and radiate energy 
back to earth in all directions. As a result, greenhouse gases increase the amount of radiation 
being absorbed by inhibiting long wavelengths to exit the atmosphere.  
Consider the following positions of the climate change debate: 
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Some experts in the climate change debate argue that the principal driving force for 
climate change is due largely in part by human activity (through processes like combustion and 
fossil fuel use). Others however argue it is inherently due to the natural fluctuation of our climate 
system that prompt these extreme weather changes.  
Those arguing that climate change is a current danger also claim the main issue is the rate 
at which the earth is warming, referencing historical climate data over time. Carbon dioxide is 
the chief climate-regulating gas of our entire climate system. Data extracted in various forms 
including: ice core samples,  tree ring samples, shift in migration patterns, plant fertilization, and 
ocean sediment to name a few, reveal evidence for phenomena such as: ocean acidification, 
shrinking ice sheets, and the rise of global temperatures. With the development in industry, there 
is an increase with the rate at which fossil fuels are burned to satisfy such high demands. This 
natural resource, when burned, releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere significantly 
affecting the composition and dynamics of the ocean system. As the atmosphere’s carbon 
dioxide content increases, a large portion of it is absorbed by the oceans causing the ph level of 
oceans to decrease (or acidify). The accumulation of carbon dioxide in our atmosphere should be 
done with caution for the simple fact that the oceans regulate the earth’s temperature and carbon 
cycle. As the climate becomes warmer (and oceans swell due to this increase in temperature), ice 
structures melt and cause an increase in sea levels (prompting floods, heat waves, storms, etc.). 
There is a large global population that relies on oceans to provide them their primary source of 
protein which contributes to the severity of ocean acidification. This poses a reasonable worry 
for those that are being affected and will be affected by the long-term ramifications associated 
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with global warming. This dilemma and the variety of responses to it can be characterized by a 
variation of Pascal’s wager. Consider the following table as a representation of the debate: 
 Catastrophic Anthropogenic 
Climate Change 
(Naturally occurring) Climate 
Change 
Conservation efforts Current and future 
generations are positively 
affected 
No rewards 
Doing nothing Current and future 
generations are negatively 
affected 
No losses 
 
Due to the potential benefits far outweighing the costs, it makes for a rational decision to 
accommodate the theory more conservative in nature because there are less risks associated with 
it (in this case). As seen above, it would be prudent to choose a path that results in the best 
situation possible, that being the health of the environment and well-being of humans. 
Accordingly, it is probably best to edge on the side of caution that tends toward safety and less 
risk. The considerable body of evidence gathered by a wide range of scientists is used to justify 
why climate change should be addressed now and the appropriate measures be taken to prevent 
further harm of the environment. The very nature of data in support of this position is such that 
proves scientific methods can be applied to anything observable and falsifiable, therefore 
exposing objective truth. 
In contrast to this argument is a position held by energy theorist, and philosopher, Alex 
Epstein who ultimately rejects current ​catastrophic ​climate change. Epstein argues that the 
framework in which we view and discuss climate change is largely in terms of the carbon 
dioxide argument (that carbon dioxide emissions are chiefly human-induced).  It is important to 
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be clear in framing any discussion what the specific concern is; in this case, are we concerned 
about carbon dioxide emissions or are we concerned about human well-being (Epstein 
advocating for the latter)? Worth noting is that Epstein acknowledges climate variation as a 
constant of nature with human activity functioning within these parameters. To view human 
activity in this way would indicate human life is intrinsically anti-environment. Epstein goes on 
to clarify two interpretations of (the natural) environment, which is pivotal to this dispute: 1) 
nature is an external force that acts ​upon ​humans; and 2) nature acts ​without any regard​ to 
humans. I think this is a critical distinction because it reveals the overarching narrative accepted 
as the relationship between human life and nature. Humans operate and live within the natural 
system and are agents of environmental influence (much like any living organism); an appeal to 
think otherwise would slip into a naturalistic fallacy, a perspective equating natural to good. This 
is fundamentally problematic due to the general consensus that humans exist external to nature 
and are thereafter affected ​by ​it. Climate is ever-changing and the language we prescribe to it 
implies an anthropomorphic position. Nature does not have intention, nor does it perform 
favoritism, it is rather nothing we think it to be because its existence simply is. Humans actively 
engage in activities that transform and modify climate at a local level which makes the planet 
more accommodating, ergo increasing human life expectancy. Epstein articulates that 
environmentalists are most concerned about reducing human impact on earth, but Epstein 
correlates that to the presence of human life. No other species of animal, as far as we know, is 
consciously making an effort to alter their environmental impact, so why are we (given that 
human activity is commensurate to birds building nests)? Epstein lastly mentions something he 
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calls the “pristine planet premise” (​The Rubin Report​) by which the view held is mother nature 
handed us a perfect world and any impact we have upon it is detrimental. 
Though both sides present plausible arguments in support of and against current climate 
catastrophe, there arises a conflict in expert opinion. Thus, begins our discussion of the 
novice-expert problem; what does a novice do in the encounter of splitting views?  
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IV. The Novice-Expert Problem 
In the event that a non-expert is confronted with the issue described above, the concern of 
expertise is accentuated. The idea of expertise is based on an epistemological inequality between 
the novice and expert who is “less likely to be mistaken and likely to be less mistaken.” 
(Hardwig, ​Toward an Ethics of Expertise​ 2) Doubt is raised in any debate where a non-expert is 
challenged with competing messages from experts. When a novice is left to arbitrate between 
several arguments defended by experts, this can cause a reluctancy toward agreement due to the 
discrepancy and lack of cooperation to settle the debate. Even though this conflict naturally 
raises doubts in a novice, the plight associated with expertise is addressed with possible solutions 
proposed by epistemologist, Alvin Goldman. He offers a method by which a non-expert can 
justifiably resolve the problem with expert tenability while also opening the discussion about the 
fundamental nature of expertise and its acceptance within individual discourse communities. In 
the following piece, my hope is to provide an analysis of Goldman’s inquiry to the novice-expert 
problem and how it can be applied to contemporary dialogue surrounding issues of public policy. 
To frame this discussion, I’d like to utilize Goldman’s definition of expert as well as provide 
information about the philosophy of expertise critiqued by persons such as: Almassi, Coady, 
Corry, Matheson, and Hardwig. I will also venture to mediate between Alvin Goldman and 
David Coady’s respective accounts for ‘going by the numbers’ (a strategy most used in public 
debate where the accepted position is due to collective opinion) by proposing conditions where 
the strategy is most effective.  1
 
1 As a side note, I will be using the terms novice and non-expert interchangeably.  
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V. Expertise & Background Information 
In this discussion, an expert is defined as “someone who possesses an extensive fund of 
knowledge (true belief) and set of methods for apt and successful deployment of this knowledge 
[toward developing] new questions in the domain” (Goldman 92). Goldman argues that this 
definition suggests expertise not be viewed as wholly a comparative matter. For example, if the 
majority of people in a field hold many false beliefs and one person does not concede to a ​few ​of 
these, said person does not qualify as an expert because they lack a ​substantial​ body of true 
beliefs (not the amount of true beliefs compared to falsehoods held by many). The idea of 
evaluating expertise should be done in regards to the individual and not compared against other 
expertises in the interest of ensuring against expertise curves (much like grading curves). To 
evaluate expertise is to focus on the arguments and techniques employed that help establish and 
rationalize an expert’s position. Goldman focuses his expert analysis on specifically cognitive 
experts (versus skill/know-how experts) that have an exceptional level of knowledge in a specific 
topic. Expertise in this sense is not concerned solely about possessing accurate information, but 
also the ability to apply that fund of knowledge toward generating new, significant, and 
productive questions. Also, it is typical for experts to possess an unusually comprehensive level 
of knowledge regarding primary questions (questions of interest for researchers) and secondary 
questions (existing evidence for primary questions) in their subject matter. This is significant 
because it can reduce difficulty found in the exchange of ideas that take place within the 
novice-expert relationship. Both parties in this case are afforded the opportunity to productively 
engage in dialogue that addresses the issue in a manner conducive to developing the 
conversation. With this goal in mind, Goldman proposes criteria a non-expert can use to 
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effectively critique experts. He offers five sources of evidence a novice can apply to the 
novice-expert problem: consider 1) arguments in support of/against the expert’s position; 2) 
agreement from other putative experts  within the same field; 3) appraisals by meta-experts ; 4) 2 3
evaluation of relevant interests and biases; and 5) evidence of the expert’s past track record. An 
interest of this paper will be directed towards points two and three, which comprise the strategy 
of ‘going by the numbers’. This is an essential component to my conclusion through which I find 
a compromise between Goldman and Coady reflecting about crowd size as an indicator of 
expertise. Additionally, I would like to clarify that Goldman’s proposition as stated is not meant 
as a definitive solution, but rather an exploration for reasons a novice can be supported in their 
deliberation of evidence. Goldman acknowledges that this area of study is non-traditional in 
some respects, therefore the solutions he offers are preliminary. Through this investigation, 
Goldman attempts to identify problems with assessing expertise through the perspective of a 
novice and suggests possible solutions to alleviate this dilemma.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 ​Specialized technical experts includes those of which are influential in their field of study concerned with 
methodology, resources, and contribution to the study in question, to name a few. This type of expert’s position is 
one of high importance and considered to be germane to the relevant discussion.  
 
3 ​Meta-expertise is the opinions of those that are used to evaluate other expertises. This type of third-party expertise 
is applicable to the novice-expert problem as it identifies reasonable evidence to ground one’s judgment of an 
expert.  
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VI. Relevance To Public Policy  
The problem of assessing expertise makes its presence in various forms, consider the 
following examples: the climate change debate, medical advice from different doctors, legal 
advice from different lawyers, advice on civil engineering from an urban planner vs an architect, 
and the execution of tasks within in a ‘chain of command’. Accordingly, the novice-expert 
problem permeates throughout much of public interaction; applying this to public policy, it is 
important to reduce uncertainty with complex issues in order to enable decision-making. The 
relevance of this toward the climate change debate is one that is currently being assessed within 
public policy. The issue of expertise is highlighted in this instance by the diversion of arguments 
presented on both sides. Though the side with greater ‘numbers’ argue for anthropogenic climate 
change, there is yet discrepancy in the debate where the lesser ‘numbers’ continue to resist the 
power of the ‘numbers’ (argument). Henceforth, Goldman’s five sources of evidence a novice 
should consult can be made of use here by citing other sources of expertise. By proposing a 
pertinent set of criteria, his goal of substantiating a novice’s position is achieved.  
People are affected in noteworthy ways in regards to decisions made in public policy; due 
to this, it is reasonable to argue that the general public is authorized to proffer solutions for civil 
issues. In not doing so would provide the public with reasons to defy policymakers by their 
disregard of public opinion in precisely a public matter. The issue with this is when policymakers 
deny proven scientific data and at the same time are held responsible to enact legislation around 
these scientific matters (i.e. the climate change debate). 
In viewing policymakers as the novice in this given situation, the novice-expert problem 
is made relevant. To clarify, the following will be an assessment of an epistemological approach 
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(knowledge-based) toward the novice-expert problem rather than one of argumentation theory. In 
argumentation theory, efforts are made to establish dialectical superiority that can serve as an 
indication of expertise. The non-expert is ill-placed to infer the relationship between content and 
supporting arguments in expert conclusions. In the absence of relevant experience, a non-expert 
does little in contributing to the technical aspects of the discussion, nonetheless, they are 
considered influential in the political rather than technical realm (i.e. cost-benefit analysis). 
Cost-benefit analysis is the process by which pros and cons of a decision is quantified; this is 
done by subtracting all possible costs from the  projected sum of benefits. This is a helpful tool 
in decision-making because it is important that policymakers reflect on all areas influenced by a 
decision so as to make a judgement most beneficial for a community.  
In our current state of affairs, policymakers are becoming more reliant on the institution 
of expertise for reasons that provide an authoritative basis for drafting purposes. It is an essential 
responsibility of a policymaker to make decisions in both areas where they are knowledgeable 
and areas where they have little to no understanding. Due to this expansive range of topics 
policymakers influence (i.e. transportation systems, legalization of drugs, environmental policy, 
criminal law, etc.), their reliance on the expertise of others is crucial. It is therefore necessary 
that expert arguments be inspected carefully and purged of any inaccuracies . As a result, I 4
suspect the opinions of experts are heavily scrutinized in an effort to avoid miscalculation that 
can negatively affect their research methods, resources, and the policymakers that relied on their 
4 ​The problem of ‘stylistic polish’, and the “dark art of rhetoric” of appearing to be an expert is raised (Coady, What 
To Believe Now 48).  Demeanor should be received with suspicion because mastering the art of debate can easily be 
done to form the illusion of expert. This can be done in many ways that include the manipulation of: composure, 
diction, style of response, argument form, body language, etc. 
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expertise.  A policymaker’s reputation is put at risk because of this, and proves why validated 5
expert opinion is so highly valued (for reasons such as incumbency). It is also important to 
inform the public with current information surrounding issues in the public sphere as it is the 
electorate that appoints policymakers their position of power. These same voters are voting for 
candidates they think are capable of implementing sensible, representational, and effective 
legislation  that benefits a community.  
Moreover, there seems to be a noticeable difference in the amount of information one has 
access to compared to twenty years ago. With the ability to inquire into just about anything, the 
internet as a tool has become ingrained in our everyday activity. We are a species that seek 
information and make sense of our surroundings. As the rise of an educated public (with the ease 
of accessing information online) enters the debate floor, the evaluation of experts is added yet 
another dimension. The way in which I utilize the term ‘debate floor’ is meant to encompass all 
persons who wish to engage in voicing their opinion on a particular discussion. Typically those 
that weigh in on a topic have at least some degree of relevant knowledge in order to inform their 
thought process. A forward-looking solution for dealing with the problem of expertise is to shift 
the focus from specialized subject matter to methods of argumentation. Doing so will allow 
non-experts to better assess claims of experts based on grounds of logic and argument form 
rather than content, which is less accessible of the two. A requirement for the comprehension of 
any technical debate is the possession of technical knowledge to refer to; this will help connect 
5 ​The institution of expertise is an intricate one with indefinite, flexible variables that attempt to identify experts in a 
field (a non-expert’s task). The institution of expertise is one of dynamic relationships that include a mutual respect 
for each other’s role in the partnership.The position of a non-expert is inherently one outside of a field’s technical 
domain; therefore in the absence of technical knowledge or relevant experience, non-expert appraisal ought to derive 
from social judgements. Through the activity of forming social judgments, a decision is made by the non-expert only 
about ​who​ to believe because the lack of technical knowledge does not serve as ground to decide ​what​ to believe. 
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supporting evidence to its proper conclusion. All this however, would be no direction of a novice 
because that would then alter the relationship from a novice-expert problem to something more 
of a relevant critic-expert problem (which is not the focus here). Once a novice obtains an ample 
amount of technical knowledge, no longer does this specific dilemma apply. The expert’s 
argument will therefore be evaluated and defined by their ability to propose well-reasoned 
arguments irrespective of their credentials. By using this technique, public participation will 
increase and add relevant experience and opinion to the information base.​ ​Moving the discussion 
from closed-off quarters to a practice more representative of the public can also result in “the 
consideration of the full range of norms, values, interests, and preferences that might bear on a 
situation” (Thomas & Buckmaster, ​Expertise and Public Policy: A Conceptual Guide​). 
Henceforth, possibilities for the most effective solutions to a problem is better handled 
free-formed than if the discussion remained sequestered. Non-experts in this sense are 
considered agents in the free-flowing exchange of ideas and not merely “passive [recipients] of 
expert activity.” (Hardwig, ​Toward an Ethics of Expertise​ 11) The ethics of expertise should be 
considered in the relationship between the non-expert and expert because in the event that an 
expert abuses their intellectual authority, the issue moves away from being a rhetorical issue to a 
moral one. The vulnerable position of a novice should therefore not be exploited by an expert. 
David Matheson, an epistemologist, makes the argument that possessing greater sensitivity in 
arguments may act as an indicator for greater credibility; this is due to Matheson’s emphasis on 
maintaining moral high ground, even in instances of debate and disagreement. For Matheson, it 
is critical to maintain ‘open-mindedness’, a cognitive trait that is “recognised as a virtue in the 
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pursuit of higher knowledge” (Thomas & Buckmaster, ​Expertise and Public Policy: A 
Conceptual Guide​).  
It is critical that while reflecting on a body of evidence a non-expert maintain a balance 
between the pursuit of truth and avoidance of falsehood. Though these acts may sound 
synonymous, both are different outcomes regarding varying degrees of inquiry. By looking at not 
what means of inquiry were conducted, “we are at the mercy of our evidence”. (Coady, ​What to 
Believe Now​ 12) Truth is a constant engagement involving current and relevant information, 
whereas to avoid falsehood is the active participation in the investigation of truth. This is done 
by putting to use techniques (such as those mentioned above) as well as performing original 
analysis to attest truth as an epistemic goal.  
Withal, looking to its practical application, some (if not, most) beliefs are held without 
the proper support. Human belief systems are too comprehensive that to investigate them 
exhaustively and furnish conclusive evidence for each would be implausible. If intellectual 
autonomy is pursued across the board, within all disciplines, one could only ever hold "relatively 
uninformed, unreliable, crude, untested, and therefore irrational beliefs." (Hardwig, ​Epistemic 
Dependence​ 340) Intellectual autonomy in all areas of a person’s interest is a fanciful, unrealistic 
ideal that cannot be attained. A paradox arising from this proposition is whether or not it is 
possible to know something one does not fully understand. To exemplify this idea, if a 
well-renowned climatologist claimed humans are the leading cause for climate change, would I 
as a novice be justified to ​know​ said claim based exclusively on my reliance of the expert? Is 
indirect knowledge a legitimate form of knowledge? The idea of being justified based on expert 
reputation is countered with an “...old and important idea that ​knowing​ a proposition requires 
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understanding the proposition and possessing the relevant evidence for its truth.” (Hardwig, 
Epistemic Dependence​ 349) Hardwig therefore claims that (partially blind) trust plays a 
significant role in the ability to know anything.  
I think it is helpful that expert claims be considered prima facie, and supported with 
empirical data thereafter (i.e. Goldman’s five sources of non-expert evidence). By granting 
experts ‘fundamental authority’ for their opinions, it acts as a blind trust that is necessary for the 
acquisition of knowledge (as claimed by Hardwig). Incorporating the ‘numbers’ strategy, this 
should serve as empirical evidence only in situations where overwhelming numbers secure a 
position. I would like to reiterate that though decisions can be made about ​who ​can be considered 
trustworthy, the ​content ​conveyed should not by any means be considered ‘known’ by the 
non-expert (referring to the earlier paradox example). In relation to the non-expert’s position to 
esoteric statements, it remains a task for the non-expert to justifiably determine one expert as 
more credible than the other on grounds of their respective practice of expertise. These efforts 
help a non-expert make decisions that can be rationalized and supported with evidence in order 
to strengthen their epistemic independence. Worth noting is that both Goldman and Coady 
defend a reductionist approach where the non-expert consults all bodies of evidence and 
performs individual analysis based on what is ‘epistemologically palatable’. It is a mistake to 
view statements as either eso/exo-teric because any given statement is only either of the two 
relative to the novice’s epistemic positioning; hence, the effect of statements are only ever 
contextual.  
An interesting point to be made here is that experts can only construct their argument 
with the appropriate evidence if they assume the position of a non-expert themselves. In order to 
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adequately evaluate issues of interest, an epistemic position is necessary in order to frame an 
investigation. From there, it is clarified by what methods and information are employed to make 
sense of an argument or presented evidence. Also worth noting is that an expert’s character 
should be assessed as should their argument content because it can inform the novice of what 
their competence, motivation(s), and objective(s) are. These aspects largely influence points four 
and five from Goldman’s list which is critical to consider. Failure to do so would result in a 
faulty receipt of the argument and its supporting evidence. To that end, the conclusion could only 
be read out of context. It is vital to frame a research question with the methods used to support a 
hypothesis; evidence is only ever helpful when presented in the context from which it was 
gathered along with the intent. In addition, a difficulty non-experts run into is having to guess 
whether the dominant position is due to evidential support or endorsed by the supermajority 
(expert that is most cited, funded, etc.). The problem of ‘going by the numbers’ is seen 
problematic in cases where ‘numbers’ are being misrepresented. This point emphasizes the 
caution that should accompany such strategy as a result of being widely used in the forming of 
one’s opinion. Numbers are easily accessible, however just as easily manipulated.  
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VII. Going By The Numbers 
As we transition to the focus of consulting ‘numbers’ (argumentum ad numerum), there is 
notable discrepancy in this method between two lead figures on the issue, Alvin Goldman and 
David Coady.  
Goldman refutes the strategy of ‘going by the numbers’ when assessing expert 
credibility. The approach relies heavily on the trustworthiness of crowd size as evidence to 
accredit an expert’s position. Goldman criticizes ‘going by the numbers’ by offering examples 
that when applied, is questionable (such as in doctrinal communities and rumor mongering). 
Moreover, Goldman claims that more often than not, members in any given field tend to be 
influenced by similar biases which affects the novice’s ability to know when expert opinion is 
distorted or validated by evidence. The fallacy of following the crowd is illustrated in these two 
examples because more people in agreement with one is not an opinion of independent thought. 
Goldman appeals to an axiom known as the non-independence principle that allows him to 
ground his opposition. The non-independence principle is described as two or more opinion 
holders sharing one source of information; this same source of information influences any one of 
their conclusions thereafter.​ ​As a result, the case for ‘numbers’ accrues no further grounds of 
validity when those who accept a proposition are impartial to an opinion already counted for. 
Intellectual autonomy is an important exercise for experts as it marks independent thought and 
different methods from which conclusions are reached. 
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However, Coady offers a qualified defense for ‘going by the numbers’ by simply arguing 
the method should not be completely ruled out. When considering supplemental evidence in 
support of expert opinion, consulting ‘numbers’ can affect the non-expert’s opinion in one of 
three ways: it can reduce, increase, or leave the initial opinion unaffected; the point Coady makes 
is that ‘numbers’ should be used cautiously. Coady also highlights the role of partnership in the 
enterprise of expertise, arguing that it is due to this interdependence of thought that scientific 
conclusions are reached. Expert consensus, Coady argues, is a product of teamwork due to the 
reliance on experts in areas outside of one’s own. It is simply impossible for an individual to 
research all topics composited into a single research question. Coady offers a proposition that 
doesn’t necessarily promote ‘going by the numbers’ in all cases, only that it shouldn’t be ruled 
out.  
In an attempt to mediate between both Goldman and Coady’s dialogue on the ‘numbers’ 
approach, I would like to propose an auxiliary examination for when ‘numbers’ should 
specifically be consulted. I acknowledge good points made in each position which serves as 
motivation for me to bridge this gap between opinion. Goldman’s non-independence principle, 
and Coady’s claim that expertise is based on partnership, are both arguments I considered while 
examining the novice-expert problem. It was important for me to recognize that there is truth in 
both being hesitant to entirely trust crowd size for reasons such as non-independent thought and 
holding too many beliefs that are not appropriately defended. Hence, I propose only in instances 
where a position has an overwhelming (and undeniable) amount of ‘numbers’, should one 
consider ‘going by the numbers’. An analogy I think proves my point can be seen in the degree 
of evidence required to find someone guilty of a crime. Much like in the court of law, there is a 
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significant difference between being proven guilty by a ‘preponderance of evidence’ and 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’; the difference lies in the ‘numbers’ (or percentage) whereupon 
guilt can be proven. Proof by a ‘preponderance of evidence’ is to prove guilt with greater than a 
50% chance, whereas ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is proved with anywhere between 90-99% 
certainty. To expand on this analogy, the goal of finding someone guilty of a crime is substituted 
with the idea of which expert a novice is inclined to find more credible. I think this application 
can serve as a useful tool that can aid the novice in determining at which point the evidence 
presented undeniably justifies one position over another. All evidence considered, if a substantial 
amount of evidence directs the novice ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, the novice can be assured 
that doubt is not as warranted had it instead been by a ‘preponderance of evidence’. This is 
because the evidence required to substantiate ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is such that if a 
reasonable person were to consult said evidence, the ​only ​logical conclusion to form would be to 
find the person guilty/find an expert more credible. With that said, the legitimacy of numbers is 
rationalized within a legal context and adds to its use as an indicator for expertise.  
Employing the proposition I offer above to the earlier example of climate change, I 
demonstrate its practical use in said discussion. As of current, the ​commonly ​(and popularly) 
cited numbers in support of and opposition of anthropogenic climate change is 97:3 (97% being 
the percentage of those arguing it is largely human-induced)(​The Rubin Report)​. Given that an 
overwhelming amount of climate scientists argue in favor of this position, all considered with 
sheer numbers, a novice is thus warranted in their inclination to be persuaded by such evidence. 
The numbers in this case are so convincing (with such a marginal number in opposition), it 
seems reasonable to derive a conclusion tending toward such evidence. There is a fundamental 
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difference in using ‘numbers’ as an indicator of expertise and using ‘numbers’ as the sole 
rationale of one’s conclusion.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
In conclusion, my objective to mediate between the positions of Goldman and Coady 
provided above serve as an additional evaluation of the ‘numbers’ approach. My hope is that by 
clarifying the issue in terms of somewhat quantifiable measurements, the utility of ‘going by the 
numbers’ is rationalized. The ability for a novice to consult sheer crowd-size as an indication of 
expertise helps justify their credence of an expert. The accreditation is warranted on the fact that 
(as explained above) using ‘numbers’ along with other empirical evidence and literary 
techniques (i.e. argument form, diction, style of speech,, fluency, etc.) endorses a justified 
position. By suggesting ‘numbers’ only be used in instances where there is significant disparity 
in views, the problem of ‘going by the numbers’ is curtailed and the possibility of misusing it is 
much reduced. The obligation of a scientific researcher is to accurately report their findings in an 
unbiased fashion, which is meant to prevent misrepresentation. Therefore, it is important that we 
guard ourselves from any possible manipulation or misinformation;  to begin this process 
includes an assessment of Goldman’s five sources expertise. The utility of this approach can be 
applied to other topics in the public arena such as: TSA policy, tax implementation, 
transportation projects, and healthcare for veterans and the disabled (to name a few) for future 
discussion. The relevance and applicability of this strategy can be favorable in developing 
opinion surrounding public policy in a time-sensitive manner that is both productive and 
efficient. 
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